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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

SALT BOWL COMPANY, a UTAH
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
13847

STATE OF UTAH,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENTS BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a Civil action to recover damages resulting
from a termination of a lease agreement between the
Respondent, Salt Bowl Company, as Lessee, and the State
of Utah as Lessor. It is the contention of the Respondent
Lessee that the termination of the lease was unjustified
under the facts and circumstances, resulting in the damages claimed by the Respondent. The case was tried in
two parts without a jury. The first on the question of
liability and the second part on the question of damages.
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DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT
The Trial Court found that the Respondent was entitled to damages caused by the wrongful termination
by the Appellant of the lease agreement between the
parties, but Mmited the Respondent's damages to a period
between the wrongful termination and a subsequent invitation of the Attorney General's office to return to the
lease premises for a "trial" which invitation was declined
by the Respondent for reasons hereinafter argued.
RELIEF SOUGHT
The Appellant seeks a reversal of the Court's finding
of liability on the part of the State of Utah and a finding
of justification for its acts in terminating the lease. The
Respondent cross appeals contending that the damages
awarded by the Trial Court, based on a theory of mitigation, were insufficient as a matter of law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondent, Salt Bowl Company, must respectfully controvert the Statement of Facts as set forth in
the Appellant's Brief, which it is submitted, is more a
legal argument concerning the interpretation of Respondent's lease than a statement of facts.
Respondent has operated automobile races and shows
since 1951, and since 1953 to the termination of its
lease by the Appellant in May 1973, operated these races
under various arrangements with the State of Utah at
the Utah State Fairgrounds (Tr. 97, Ln. 8-15). As a
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continuajtaon of this relationship, the Appellant as Lessor
and the Respondent as Lessee entered into a five year
lease agreement on October 11, 1967 (Ex. P-l, R-32, Tr.
20). The lease was for a period commencing May 1,1968,
to May 1, 1973. Under the lease agreement the Respondent was required to make substantial improvements to
the premises in a minimum amount of $15,000.00 (Ex.
P-l paragraph 12, page 4), during an initial five year
term. Further, the Lease Agreement contained an exclusive option to renew the Lease Agreement for an additional term of five years, by the Respondent giving
notice of his intention to do so prior to the expiration
of the original term (Ex. P-l, paragraph 18, page 8, 9).
The Lease Agreement granted the Respondent the right
to use the premises, not only for "auto racing" as stated
by Appellant, but (Ex. P-l, paragraph 1, page 2):
"To have the exclusive right to promote and conduct motor vehicle races, exhibitions and thrill
shows for public admission, together with such
other related activities, including advertising, as
may be reasonably connected with or incidental
to the foregoing." (Emphasis added.)
During the original term of the lease, the Respondent
made the agreed improvements (Tr. 98, Ln. 21-23), and
on approximately April 24, 1973, the Respondent served
upon the Appellant its notice of intention to renew the
lease, and requested that it be furnished an acknowledged
copy (Tr. 99, Ln. 2-13). On May 10, 1973, the Appellant
by its Director of Expositions, Mr. Hugh C. Bringhurst,
advised the Respondent the lease would not be renewed,
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notwithstanding the Respondent's timely notice of renewal. Mr. Bringhurst testified that the May 10th Notice of Violation was drawn at the direction of Mr. Frank
Nelson of the Appellant's Attorney General's Office (Tr.
126, Ln. 24-28). Mr. Bringhurst also stated that he personally knew of no reason for the cancellation (Tr. 127,
Ln. 26-30). Two days later on May 12, 1973, the Appellant served upon the Respondent, a second notice of
cancellation (Ex. P-4). This second notice cited as the
reason for the Appellant's action an alleged violation of
the Lease Agreement on the previous September 6, 1972,
over eight months prior to the serving of the same, and
further advised the Respondent that (Ex. P-4):
"Said termination to be effective on the 6th day
after service of this notice since there is no way
in which the said violation can be corrected within the said period of time." (Emphasis added.)
Pursuant to the two notices served upon the Respondent it advised the various parties involved, the
Drivers Association, the Public Relations Office, the
Advertising Agency, of the Respondent's action and the
cancellation of the lease (Tr. 103, Ln. 24-104, Ln. 2). On
June 8, 1973, the Respondent filed a claim for damages
with the Appellant (R. 68), and immediately thereafter,
on June 11, 1973, the Respondent, by Robert B. Hansen,
Deputy Attorney General, advised the Respondent by
letter (Ex. D-10), inter alia,
"We propose that you conduct a race and see
whether you are correct." (Emphasis added.)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
The Respondent replied that it would reinstate its racing
program for the summer if the Appellant in turn would
reinstate the contract of the Respondent, which Respondent, then as now, contended had been wrongfully cancelled. Mr. Papwoorth, President of the Respondent,
stated the Respondent's position (Tr. Ill, Ln. 7-13):
"A. They would not reinstate it. I believe they
were talking about letting me go out and see
what I could do, and then they would give me a
new contract, but that was not my position. My
position was that I had a contract, that I hadn't
violated it. They terminated it. They should
have — if they felt there was something wrong,
they should reinstate it, withdraw their termination."
And again stating the position of the Respondent
(Tr. Ill, Ln. 28):
"A. All they had to do was withdraw their
notice of violation, and I would have a valid
contract, and I would go out and race and take
my changes on living within any laws that anybody had."
Appellant's continued refusal to honor the Respondent's
contract according to its terms gave rise to the present
litigation and the Respondent's claim for damages.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
AFTER FINDING THAT THE RACE CON-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
DUCTED ON SEPTEMBER 6, 1972 WAS IN
VIOLATION OF 32-9-3, REVISED ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY, THE COURT
ERRED IN NOT CONCLUDING THAT VIOLATION WAS A LEGALLY JUSTIFIABLE
GROUNDS FOR SERVICE "notice of violation" ON RESPONDENT, SALT BOWL COMPANY.
The Appellant opens its argument concerning this
point with the statement that "the Court found that the
race conducted on September 6, 1972, was in violation
of a Salt Lake City "Noise Control Ordinance". Appellant cites as a "finding of fact," a colloquy between the
Court and Counsel at the conclusion of which the Court
went on to state, (Tr. 192, Ln. 29, 193, Ln. 4).
"Under the Lease Agreement I would have to
find the notice of violation dated May 11th was
ineffective and find that the — that's 1973 —
and would also have to find that the Plaintiff Is
notice of renewal of the lease is effective and find
that the lease has been valid since May 1, 1973."
A reading of the record concerning the Court's comments in this regard will show that the quoted statement
was in no way a "Finding of Fact" in the accepted sense
and the Findings entered by the Court do not include
any such Finding. As the Court stated in the course
of the same conversation, "I can't see that it makes any
difference" (Tr. 192, Ln. 23-24). !
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As the argument ol this point is based on the Appellant's insistance that its primary concern was that the
Respondent had violated a Salt Lake City Ordinance,
Respondent submits that it is appropriate to demonstrate
by the Appellant's own witnesses how basically specious
this argument is.
In fact the testimony of the state's witnesses demonstrates that the decision had been made to cancel and
dishonor the Respondent's lease before the Appellant was
even aware of the claimed violation and that this claim is
a complete afterthought
The Lease Agreement, Exhibit P-l, was arrived at
af tor the Respondent had been a tenant of the Appellant
for approximately fifteen (15) years, contemplated substantial improvements to be made at the expense of the
Respondent Lessee, and was entered into alter extended
review, consideration and public hearings (Tr. 122, Ln.
15 to Tr. 123, Ln. 22 and Ex. 14-P to 20-P inclusive).
Alter providing (Ex. P-l ar. 9, page 4) that the "Lessee
shall comply with all federal, state and local laws" the
lease goes on (Ex. P-l, Par. 13, page 6).
"It is expressly understood and agreed that in
the event Lessee's activities upon the leased
premises are determined by any Court having
jurisdiction to be unlawful or to constitute a
public nuisance, whether in litigation commenced
by anyone, then and in such event, this lease
agreement shall be terminated forthwith, and the
obligations of both parties hereunder shall be immediately avoided and suspended." (Emphasis
added.)
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In the context in which the lease was entered into, contemplating as it did substantial investment by the Respondent, it is apparent that the panties contemplated
that the Respondent would have the protection of due
process of law in defending any claimed violation of any
such laws. Obviously the Office of the Attorney General
is not a "Court having jurisdiction", and it was precisely
the type of arbitrary and capricious action that was subsequently taken by the Appellant, that the Respondent
sought to avoid by the cited provision of its lease. Neither
Mr. Papworth nor the Respondent, Salt Bowl Company,
have ever been charged with or convicted of any violation
of any federal, state or local law. See inter alia the testimony of Mr. Frank Nelson of the Office of the Attorney
General (Tr. 147, Ln. 6-10) where he stated:
"Q. But you — now, let me put it another way.
To your knowledge has the Salt Bowl Company
or Mr. Papworth ever been charged with a violation of any local, county, state, or federal law
of any kind in his operation of the Salt Bowl?
A. Not to my knowledge, they have not."
Mr. Hugh C. Bringhurst, the Director of Expositions
of the State Fair, testified as to the negotiating of the
lease in the summer of 1967, (Tr. 122, Ln. 15-30) that
in his capacity he was "more or less the landlord" on
behalf of the state (Tr. 123, Ln. 27-28), that the Respondent had been a "good tenant", (Tr. 124, Ln. 10) "a very
good tenant" and had "been very cooperative", (Tr. 124,
Ln. 12-13). Mr. Bringhurst testified that the race scheduled for September 4, 1972, was cancelled because of rain
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and that Mr. Papworth requested permission to change
the race to September 6th, which permission was granted
by Mr. Bringhurst. Mr. Bringhurst testified to receipt
of the notice of renewal (Tr. 125, Ln. 8-30).
Notwithstanding the Respondent's performance of
its lease according to its terms, Mr. Bringhurst testified
as to a conversation had between himself and Mr. Frank
Nelson of the office of the Attorney General which conversation gave rise to the first "Notice of Violation", Exhibit P-3. Mr. Bringhurst testified to his conversation
with Mr. Nelson as follows (Tr. 127, Ln. 2 to Tr. 128,
Ln. 23):
"Q. Would you tell us the substance of that
telephone conversation or, first, do you know
when it took place?
A. It was just before I wrote that letter. I'm
not definite on the dates.
Q. The letter is dated May 10. Was your telephone call on that date?
A. Could have been, yes.
Q. Would you state the substance of that conversation, just what was said?
A. Well, we were just talking as to — said we
could find reasons for not having the race and
for cancelling the contract and to write the letter
and I would pick up a letter from him that morning.
Q. What did he say concerning reasons?
A. That there was reasons to cancel the contract, and I could pick the letter up that morning.
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Q. Was there any more discussion than that?
A. Well, just conversation about the races and
so forth.
Q. Well, what was said about the races by yourself and by Mr. Nelson? What did he say, and
what did you say?
A. Well, I said there was a contract, and / could
see no reason to cancel the contract, and he said,
"whoever prepared that contract was not too
good at doing contracts", words to that effect.
Q. Did you — did I understand you to say that
you said you didn't know of any reason to cancel it?
A. Yes.
Q. And what was his response to that?
A. Well, he said there was.
Q. Did he tell you what it was?
A. Well, he said one reason, the Governor didn't
want any races.
Q. Do you recall the taking of your deposition
at the office of the attorney general on July 18,
1973?
A. Yes.
MR. HOBBS: On page 8 at line 17, Counsel.
Q. Do you recall being asked these questions
and making these answers:
Question, "Did you have any objection to
the lease being cancelled?"
Answer, "Well, I could not see any reason
for the lease being cancelled in my opinion."
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Question, "Did you express that opinion to
Mr. Nelson?"
Answer, "Yes."
Question, "What did he say?"
Answer, "Well, he said that was, as I recall,
was something like 'nothing to do with me. We
are going to cancel the lease.'"

A. That's right.
Q. Were you asked those questions and made
those answers?
A. Yes." (Emphasis added.)
Further, on cross examination, Mr. Bringhurst was
questioned concerning the supposed reasons for cancellation ol the Respondent's lease and replied as follows (Tr.
130, Ln. 19 to 25):
Q. Did he talk to you at that time about what
reasons he was going to put in the letter?
A. Well, as I understood it, he was searching
out to find the reasons to put in the letter, and
we had discussed — I couldn't see why we should
cancel it on the grounds that all he had to do
was write a letter to renew it and — in fact, I
didn't get the letter until quite a while later.
(Emphasis added.)
Mr. Frank Nelson, of the Attorney General's office testified to the writing of a letter concurrently with his instructions to Mr. Bringhurst to give notice of cancellation,
said letter being Exhibit 12 P and addressed to Mr. Mil-
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ton Weilenmann, concurrently with his instructions to
Mr. Bringhurst to give Mr. Papworth his first "Notice
of Violation", (Ex. 3 P) as follows:
Q. But it doesn't say anything about any
specific violation?
A. No, it does not.
Q. The Exhibit 12-P, the letter you wrote on
May 10, what I am really getting at makes no
reference to the changing of that date from the
4th to the 6th of September, does it?
A. No, it does not.
Q. In fact, you did not even know about that
when you wrote that letter, did you?
A. That's correct.
Q. You learned it later?
A.

That's correct.

Q. So that you were prepared to cancel the
plaintiff's lease before you ever knew that he
had changed that date from the 4th to the 6th?
A. That is correct.
Q. And then when it was learned that he had
changed the date from the 4th to the 6th, he was
given a notice citing that as a reason. Is that
correct?
A. Yes, as one of the reasons. This was later
information. We thought we had sufficient
grounds before that time, but that was an additional reason. (Emphasis added.)
Further, Mr. Nelson admitted a lack of knowledge of any

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
legal violation,, (Tr. 147, Ln. 6-10). Again, Mr. Nelson
testified (Tr. 148, Ln. 14-17): his answer,
"A. Yes. I might qualify that to say that perhaps there was a violation in racing on a date
other than was approved, but again I'm not even
sure that I had that information at the time
that this particular letter was written.,,
Respondent has no particular argument with the
citations of authorities cited by Appellant in its Argument on this point other than to observe that each
of them completely begs the ultimate question. It would
appear from the Appellant's argument that it was extremely concerned about zoning variances or the lack of
them, possible future violations of law, etc., when, in
fact, the evidence demonstrates that these were all afterthoughts, searched out to justify the capricious and arbitrary actions of the Appellant. In conclusion it should
be noted that the Respondent did not need a variance
from the city as a condition of operating its race track
and running a race under its contract, and if Respondent
had been accused of a violation of law, which it never
has been except in Appellant's brief, it was entitled to
due process, its "day in Court" under the terms of the
contract. Further^ it was apparent that the Appelant
was "out to get" the Respondent even before it was
aware of the change of date of the previous Labor Day
race, which change of date was with the Appellant's consent (Tr. 104, Ln. 10-14). It is submitted that the claimed
violation only became important when the Appellant re-
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alized that it was about to be called to account for its
high-handed dealings with the Respondent.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE
NOTICE OF VIOLATION SERVED MAY 12,
1973, WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE TERMS
OF THE LEASE.
Again the Appellant reiterates the proposition that
the Respondent had violated a Salt Lake City zoning
ordinance despite the record. On page 13 of its Brief the
Appellant states,
"On the 6th day of September, 1972 . . . the Respondent conducted races which violated the
'noise control' ordinance."
This statement is not supported by the record, or by the
findings of the Court. If there was a violation, which
can only be supposition, the respondent was never
charged or convicted "by any Court having jurisdiction,"
and again it is submitted that the claimed violation is
an afterthought and justification for action which had
already been taken by the Appellant. The Court commenting on the injection of this issue into the trial proceedings observed to counsel for the Appellant (Tr. 186,
Ln. 22-30).
"Your evidence of violation on the sixth was
weak, awfully weak. However, as a matter of
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fact, I think you could find a violation or a nonviolation — as far as that letter is concerned, that
is hearsay, and I admitted that on the basis of
notice of not granting a variance, as I recall.
It did not go to the truthfulness of what was
stated therein as to violation or as to maximum
amount of noise that the race track did make."
Appellant attempts to make much of the fact that the
Respondent had conducted various tests to insure that
he would be able to comply with any restrictions placed
upon him by the city, if the proposed restrictions if in
fact proved to be lawful when tried to a "Court having
jurisdiction". Mr. Fapworth explained under direct examination (Tr. 168, Ln. 4-8):
A. Well, I don't really remember that he said
anything of that nature. I mentioned afterwards
to I think the President that we would have to
make some changes in our operation, that we
were going to try to live with the ordinance and
do our best to comply with it, and I think that
came out in the paper the next day.
Q. Now, why did you say that?
A. Because they hadn't granted the variance,
and we were going to proceed and do whatever
we had to do to comply with it.
Q. Does this imply that under the ordinance
that the decibel would have been above—
A. Not necessarily.
Q. — the ordinance?
A. We don't know.
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The record is clear that while Mr. Papworth felt that
he was operating lawfully and would be able to operate
within the proposed ordinance, he was taking every
precaution to make sure that any modification necessary
under the law would be made. To forestall the Respondent's attempts to continue (as he had for twenty (20)
years) a lawful operation, the Appellant caused to be
served upon the Respondent a notice that his contract
was cancelled (Ex. 3-P). This notice stated no reason
for the cancellation for the simple reason that is shown
in the preceding argument that at that point the Appellant knew of no reason.
Two days later, on May 12, 1973, after learning that
the Respondent had changed the race schedule for a
preceding September 4, 1972, to September 6, which
change was with the express permission of the State,
seized upon this meager straw to serve a second "notice
of violation" (Ex. 4-P) which stated:
"Said termination to be effective on the 6th day
after service of this notice since there is no way
in which the violation can be corrected within the
said period of time."
The Appellant urges that the Lease Agreement provides
two methods of termination. Respondent disagrees with
this interpretation, and contends that a plain reading of
the contract indicates only one method of termination
in the event that it is claimed that Respondent's activSties on the leased premises were unlawful, and that is thait
this matter be determined by a Court having jurisdiction
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prior to such termination. It appears obvious that the
method of cancellation provided by panagraphs 9 and
16 contemplates a nonpayment of rent or any other violation of the terms of the Lease whidi do not constitute
an unlawful act, but merely noncompliance. Squarely in
point is the observation ait 49 Am. Jur. 2d pg. 1008 at
par. 1043, "illegal use" where it is stated:
" past use by a Lessee of the premises for an
illegal purpose does not, when such use has been
discontinued, justify the Lessor in summarily
removing the tenant on any theory of the right
to abate a public nuisance. So it is held that the
discontinuance of an illegal use prior to the institution of proceedings by the Lessor to oust
the tenant, is a good defense to such proceedings, although it is otherwise with regard to a
discontinuance after the ouster proceedings are
instituted . . . also, where the landlord with
knowledge of the tenant's illegal use of the premises does not base his right to oust the tenant
on such fact, he cannot, as an afterthought, base
his act in ousting the tenant for other reasons,
upon the ground that the tenant was using the
premises for an illegal purpose." (Emphasis
added.)
This observation treats precisely what the Appellant attempted to do, i.e. to justify its wrongful action by seeking out a spurious reason as an afterthought.
The case of Gerard vs. Young, 20 Utah 2nd 30, 342
Pacific 2nd 343(1967), cited by the Appellant as authority for its actions is so far removed from the facts of the
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instant case as to be of no authority whatever. In Gerard,
the Lessee was accused of illegal use of the premises in
allowing gambling, and responded by resorting to the
Fifth Amendment. That situation has nothing to do
with the instant case, where no violation of law has ever
been alleged or proven, and the Respondent has demonstrated throughout the record his good faith efforts to
comply with the law in every respect.
Further, with reference to the claim of forfeiture by
reason of an illegal or unlawful use, the case of Murphy
vs. Traynor, 135 P&c. 2d 145, 230 at 232 (Colo.), and the
cases cited therein are in pertinent point. In thait case, as
in this, a Lessee had entered into a lease, agreeing to make
substantial improvements. He had also agreed as in the
instant case, that he would use the premises for certain
specified purposes only, and would not violate any Federal,, State or Local laws. The premises were operated
as a liquor store and the Lessee was convicted, along with
an employee, of a sale of liquor to a minor. The Lessor
claimed a forfeiture under the terms of the contract
and brought suit to regain possession. The Court directed
a verdict in favor of the Lessee which was affirmed on
appeal. The Court, after observing that the law looks
with disfavor upon forfeitures, stating:
"If the contracting parties had the purpose of
working a forfeiture upon a solitary conviction
for violation of the liquor law, they must say
so in plain words."
In the instant case, Respondent has not even been
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afforded the "solitary cxmvictoon", even though the negotiations and agreement of the parties clearly amitemplated
this.
In connection with the claim of a violation by the
Respondent on September 6, 1972, Mr. Nelson testified
that he did not know of the change in schedule from September 4th to September Gth or of any claimed violation when he wrote the Department of Development Services (Exhibit 12-P) and when he directed the Director
of the Division of Expositions (Exhibit 3-P) to cancel
the Plaintiff's lease. It was only after this action had
been taken that the change of schedule came to Mr.
Nelson's attention and this claimed violation was seized
upon (Exhibit 4-P) to send a further notice of termination. Even assuming, for the purpose of argument, that
there had been a violation on September 6th, it would
have been the only violation in a period of approximately
20 years in connection with the Plaintiff's use of the leased
premises.
In concluding its argument on this point the Appellant states at page 14 of its Brief, with reference to Exhibit 4-P, the "notice of violation" dated May 11, 1973,
and served May 12:
"This 'notice of violation' gave the Respondent
five days to cure . . ."
This statement is simply not a true statement of the
facts and an examination of Exhibit 4-P will show on
its face that it states, not that there are five days to
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cure but that there is "no way" to cure the claimed violation.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO THE RESPONDENT BASED ON
ACTIONS OF THE APPELLANT WHICH
WERE IN HARMONY WITH THE LEASE
AGREEMENT AND NON ACTION ON THE
PART OF RESPONDENT WHO FAILED TO
EITHER CURE OR CHALLENGE THE NOTICE OF VIOLATION.
The Appellant's argument on this point retreats somewhat from the claimed "violation" argument and instead
argues a "reasonable belief of violation" inteipretation
of the lease (Ex. P-l). It is submitted that the lease by
its terms does not justify any such construction, when
it plainly and without ambiguity states that (Ex. P-l,
page 6, Par. 13):
"In the event Lessee's activities upon the leased
premises are deteraiinied by any Court having
jurisdiction to be unlawful . . . " (Emphasis
added.)
It is further submitted that, not only does the lease agreement fail to justify the actions of the Appellant if based
on a reasonable belief, but that the record amply shows
that the Appellant in fact had no such belief of a violation at all, other than as an excuse or afterthought to
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justify the actions which it had already determined it
would take.
Further, Appellant deplores the fact that after receiving the "Notice of Violation" that Respondent "did
nothing". The Respondent, in fact, repeatedly attempted
to have his lease honored by the Appellant according to
its teams. First it should be noted that the Respondent
did not have continuous possession of the leased premises, but entered only on scheduled racing nights and
with the permission of the Appellant by its agents. As
stated by Mr. Papworth (Tr. 104, Ln. 30, to Tr. 105, Ln.
11):
Q. (By Mr. Hobbs) Now, Mr. Papworth, under your lease agreement how did you operate?
Did you have permanent quarters there on the
Fairgrounds?
A. No. We had access to the area on our scheduled night, and that's the only time we had access to it.
Q. And you weren't in continuous possession of
the property?
A. Not at all.
Q. You were allowed in on your race nights?
A. Yes. On race nights the employees would
come over and unlock the facilities so we could
use them.
Q. And then when you finished using them, you
would leave and they would lock them up again?
A. That is correct.
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The situation as described by Mr. Bringhurst (Tr. 137,
Ln. 11-20):
Q. Under Mr. Papworth's arrangement, the Salt
Bowl Company's arrangement, you and your employees controlled the physical access to the
grounds, did you not?
A. Yes.
Q. You opened the gates, unlocked them and
let people in when it was their time?
A. Yes.
Q. And let them out and locked the gates when
they were through?
A.

Yes*

Mr. Papworth was aware of the contemplated action of
Salt Lake City and its proposed noise ordinance and made
preparations, both to attempt to comply with the ordinance as well as to test its validity and legality, as he
was entitled to do under the terms of his lease and to a
Court having jurisdiction. In the words of Mr. Bringhurat (Tr. 136, Ln. 1-12).
Q. And he did intend to contest it in the court?
A. That is the understanding I had.
Q. As well as attempt to comply with it?
A. Yes. We discussed other ways to comply
with it, building a fence along the north side with
burlap on it to control the noise, but it was so
low that we didn't think that was feasible either.
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Q. But Mr. Papworth did devote quite a bit of
time and thought to complying with this ordinance?
A. Yes.
Q. As well as contesting it?
A. Yes.
As to the claim that Mr. Papworth did nothing following
the notice of violation, it is again submitted that the
record does not support this contention and in fact completely controverts it. Mr. Papworth repeatedly requested that the Appellant reinstate the contract and
allow him access to the promises. And, as he stated (Tr.
Ill, Ln. 25, Tr. 112, Ln. 5):
A. Well, I state again I had a contract. If they
would reinstate it, I would go out and race from
now on.
Q. What were the conditions in the reinstatement?
A. All they had to do was withdraw their notice of violation, and I would have a valid contract, and I would go out and race and take my
chances on living within any laws that anybody
had.
Q. Well, did they specifically tell you what you
would need to do before they could reinstate the
contract?
A. No. All they stated was that they couldn't
reinstate the contract.
Again Mr. Papworth in referring to a conversation had
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between himself and Mr. Gibbs of the Attorney General's office testified (Tr. 173, Ln. 19-27):
A. Well, my position, if you will let me explain
it, and I explained to Mr. Bringhurst, who is the
man I was dealing with from the very first day
that this occurred, Mr. Gibbs called and said,
"What can we do? Let's get this thing resolved.
Let's get some racing going. What do we have
to do to get out of this predicament?"
And I said, "Reinstate my lease. Let me go race
and fight my battle with the City. If I violate
the ordinance, let me see if I am right or wrong,
and you stay out of it . . ."
Thus it would appear that it was not Mr. P&pworth or
the Respondent that was "doing nothing" but rather it
was the Appellant who refused to honor the lease according to its terms or to grant the Respondent access
to the leased premises. It is obvious that the Respondent did not wish to go upon the premises as a trespasser
or as an invitee but only (as he was entitled to do) as
a Lessee with a valid and subsisting lease which he had
in no way violated and which he was entitled to have
honored by the Appellant. Appellant's argument of "reasonable belief of a violation" is not only specious, but
completely negates the standards for cancellation as
specifically set out in the lease and in the dealings of the
parties over the previous twenty years.
POINT I. ON CROSS APPEAL
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS
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DETERMINATION THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES ARE LIMITED TO SIX
RACES IN 1973 AND THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES WERE TERMINATED
BY REASON OF THE DEFENDANT'S LETTER OF JUNE 11, 1973, ADVISING THE
PLAINTIFF THAT IT SHOULD CONDUCT
A RACE.
Following the cancellation of the Respondent's lease,
the Respondent on June 8, 1973, filed its claim for damages (Exhibit 13-P). In immediate response to the Respondent's claim,, the Appellant by Mr. Robert B. Hanson, wrote a letter on June 11, 1973, (Exhibit 21-D) inviting the Respondent inter alia "We propose that you
conduct race and see whether you are correct." Obviously
this did not constitute a reinstatement of the Respondent's lease or any concession that the lease was valid
but merely stated that he could come run "a race". As
to who would "see whether you are correct" the letter
is unclear but apparently the Office of the Attorney General was to be the judge and jury, i.e. the "Court of competent jurisdiction" contemplated by the agreement of
the parties.
Of course Mr. Papworth refused to concede to tins
position and instead reiterated his right to have his lease
agreement honored. At a meeting shortly subsequent in
the chambers of the District Court, a conversation was
held between Mr. Hanson of the Attorney General's Of-
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fice and Mr. Papworth, which Mr. Papworth described
as follows (Tr. 120, Ln. 25 to Tr. 121, Ln. 9):
A, Yes. I believe on July 11 over in the new
county (x>urthouse building, at that time we were
appearing in Judge Baldwin's court, and Mr.
Hanson of the Attorney General's office had
stated in court that we were invited to race, at
which time the judge asked us to go talk it over.
We went out in the hall, and at that time I informed Mr. Hanson again that if he would reinstate the contract — this was on July 11 — and
pay damages that I had suffered up to this date,
we would certainly go race.
Q. And what was Mr. Hanson's response to

ttot?

A. Well, Mr. Hanson said he couldn't reinstate
the contract, that if we wanted to go out and
hold a race, that we had their permission; but
again I told him that we wouldn't do anything
until we had a firm contract, that our original
contract was back in force. (Emphasis added.)
Actually this conversation took place on July 17,1973
(Tr. 121, Ln. 15). Mr. Papworth further explained his
portion (Tr. 172, Ln. 30 to Tr. 173, Ln. 2).
A. Well, I was told to go out and try a race,
and my reply was that "You reinstate my contract, and I will go out and race." (Emphasis
added.)
Again, the question occurs, try it to whom? A Court of
competent jurisdiction? Obviously the answer is to try
it to the whims of the Attorney General's Office, who had
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already prejudged the case. Indeed the present position
of the Appellant is quite contrary to the action of the
Appellant in negotiating a contract on behalf of the
state with unrelated third parties, the Salt Lake Valley
Racing Association, in the latter part of July and the first
week in August of 1973 (Tr. 181, Ln. 3-8, Tr. 183, Ln. 1).
While this contract was never executed it was nevertheless drafted and submitted to the Division of Expositions,
by and with the approval of Mr. Hanson and in complete
derogation of the rights of the Respondent, and in complete rontradiction to the position taken by the Appellant
in his present argument, that the Respondent could race
"anytime he wanted". Referring to the drafting of the
contract with third parties (Tr. 183, Ln. 18-22), Mr. Hanson testified:
Q.

(By Mr. Hobbs) It was drafted?

A. It was drafted. A proposed contract was
submitted to the Division of Expositions.
Q. With your approval?
A. With my approval.
It is submitted that such conduct on the part of the Appellant as described above, did not terminate or limit the
Respondent's right to damages but in fact if anything
proved the ongoing nature of such damages.

POINT II. ON CROSS APPEAL
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS
DETERMINATION THAT THE PLAINTIFF
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WAS UNDER A DUTY TO MITIGATE ITS
DAMAGES BY REASON OF THE LETTER
WRITTEN BY THE DEFENDANT ON JUNE
11* 1974.
It appears that the trial court considered Mr. Hanson's letter of June 11, (Ex. 21-D) in response to the
Respondent's claim for damages (which letter incidentally
appears to be completely self serving) constituted some
sort of reinstatement of the Respondent's rights under
the lease agreement and an invitation that "all is forgiven" and that he could come back and conduct his
automobile events as in the past. As is shown by the
previous argument this simply was not the fact. It was
an invitation to run "a race" — and nothing more —
as a sort of trial to be conducted and determined by the
prosecutor. Mr. Fapworth attempted to explain this to
Mr. Hanson, inter alia (Tr. 224, Ln. 12-23).
WITNESS: He invited us to go out and race,
and I said that I would be happy to if he would
reinstate our contract. I didn't want to go out
and hold one race — in fact, it would be impossible because at that time the drivers were running
in Springville, and the only way —
THE COURT: Just — you are not responsive
to the question. Just tell us what was said.
WITNESS: Oh.
Q. (By Mr. Hobbs) Did you tell Mr. Hanson
these things that you are telling us?

A. Yes.
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THE COURT: All right.
A. And I said that if he would reinstate the
contract, I would see if I could get the drivers to
come back and support me for the balance of
the season, and he refused to reinstate it.
And again Mr. Papworth testified (Tr. 225 ,Ln. 7-20) :
A. I told him if he would reinstate the contract,
we would go out and race and, if necessary, go
into court and test the noise law, but we wanted
to go out and be able to finish the season.
Q. And did you at that time explain to Mr.
Hanson any of the difficulties you had in starting up the season?
A. Yes. Racing is like —
Q. Just tell us what you told Mr. Hanson.
A. Well, as I recall, I told him that we plan
ahead for several months and get ready and
have the schedule set for the season. We have
point system for the season, and many things
enter into it that the drivers look forward to,
not for one race but for the season as a whole,
special events and things of this nature.
The record is clear that the letter of June 11 was in no
sense a reinstatement of the contract; and Mr. Hanson
on repeated subsequent occasions refused to consider it
as such. Under these circumstances it is difficult to see
how the Respondent was in any position to even attempt
to mitigate his damages. The premises were in physical
control of the Appellant, and the Respondent had been
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told unequivocally and repeatedly that there was "no
way" that his contract would be reinstated.
It is submitted that the doctrine of mitigation, or the
doctrine of avoidable consequences, does not require that
a Lessee with contract rights under his lease enter upon
premises wrongfully withheld from him by trespass or as
an invitee. The doctrine is stated at 22 Am. Jur. 2nd
P. 53, Damages, Par. 32 as follows:
32. Nature and extent of the doctrine.
Under the doctrine of avoidable consequences,
the injured person need not make extraordinary
efforts or do what is unreasonable or impracticable in his efforts to minimize damages; reasonable diligence and ordinary care are all that
is required to allow full recovery of all damages caused by the defendant's wrongful activity.
More completely stated, the consequences of an
injury are recoverable where the injured party
acts with such care and diligence as a man of
ordinary prudence would under the circumstances, and his efforts to minimize damages are
determined by the rules of common sense, good
faith, and fair dealing. (Emphasis added.)
See also 22 Am. Jur. 2d P. 56, Damages, Part. 33:
33. Generally.
. . . the innocent party is not required to take extraordinary efforts to avoid the losses from the
breach of contract nor is he expected to incur
risks or spend substantial sums of money to
protect the defaulter. Nor need he sacrifice a
substantial right of his own in order to minimize

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

31
his loss. All that is required of the nondefaulting party — in measuring his damages — is that
he act reasonably so as not unduly to enhance
the damages caused by the breach. (Emphasis
added.)
Further, it should be noted that Mr. Fapworth's testimony concerning the various conversations with the
agents of the Appellant, his efforts to comply in every
respect with the terms of his lease, and his attempts subsequent to the action taken by the Appellant to obtain
a reinstatement of his lease, are each completely uncontradicted in any respect by any of the testimony of Appellant's witnesses.
See Peterson vs. Piatt, 400 P. 2d 507, 16 Utah 2d
330. See also Coidos vs. Desimone, 208 P. 2d 105 (Washington). See also 163 S. E. 2d 273 (Kentucky) wherein
it is stated:
"To evict a tenant is to deprive him of the possession of the leased premises or disturb him in
their beneficial enjoyment so as to cause the
tenant to abandon the premises. This amounts
to a constructive eviction. It is not necessary
that there should have been an actual, physical
eviction or even a lawsuit. There is an eviction
if the acts of the landlord are such as will justify
or warrant the tenant in leaving the premises
and he does in fact abandon them."
CONCLUSION
The court correctly determined that the notice of
violation served upon the Respondent by the Appellant
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was not justified under the facts and cireumsttances as
they existed at the time, and that the Respondent was
entitled to the benefits of his lease agreement and the
renewal thereof. The facts demonstrate that the notice
of violation was not justified either by the existing facte
or by the terms and conditions of the lease agreement.
The attempt of the Appellant to interject into these proceedings an issue completely outside the scope of this
litigation, an issue which if it had any merit at all which
the Respondent denies, should have been a matter of
litigation between the Respondent and Salt Lake City,
and a matter which had nothing whatever to do with the
State of Utah was without merit. If the Appellant desired to terminate the Respondent's activities it had available to it the remedy of condemnation or negotiation,
rather than a resort to bullying tactics followed by lame
excuses in attempted jiistificaition.
The method by which the court arrived at the Respondent's damages for each of its cancelled events is not
questioned by the Respondent, nor so far as appears from
the record at this point, by the Appellant. However it
was error for the court to limit the Respondent's damages
to the short period of time between the cancellation of
the Respondent's lease and Respondent's invitation to
return and "try a race" — a period of approximately six
weeks — when the record clearly shows that the acts and
intent of the Appellant both before and after this date,
June 11, 1973, were quite contrary to its now claimed
invitation." The determination of the trial court finding the Appellant liable for the breach of the Respon-
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dent's lease should be affirmed, and the court's finding
limiting the Respondent's damages to the period ol May
12 to June 16 should be reversed as insufficient as a matter of law, and the case remanded for further proceedings
for the determination of the Respondent's damages.
Respectfully submitted,
LEE W. HOBBS
Attorney for Respondent
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